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THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL ISSUE 1967·1971
A SUPERPOWER SYMBIOSIS?
James A. Barry, Jr.
Advances in marine engineering, life
support, and other technologies are continuing to render the ocean floor at
increasing depths accessible for resource
exploitation, scientific research, and,
potentially, military uses. The availability of high-strength steels and aluminum alloys, fiberglass reinforced plastic,
titanium, and beryllium could presage
the construction of submarine hulls for
operation at 20,000 feet-far deeper
than the record depth attained by the
bathyscaphe "Trieste." Nuclear energy
could enable such vehicles to operate at
maximum depth for extended periods.
The application of high-strength materials to undersea structures coupled
with new developments in remote
sensing and manipulation (telechirics)
could, in the foreseeable future, render
the ocean floor open to both economic
and military exploitation. The U.S.

Navy's Sealab experiments, as well as
similar programs by the Soviet Union,
suggest that it may soon be possible for
men to work for extended periods of
time at great depths. In short, the
seabed is becoming a tempting area for
future military and economic expansion
by the technologically advanced powers,
an unclaimed domain of increasing
salience in the relations between the
superpowers. 1
Since 1967 the international community has demonstrated more and
more concern for the future of this vast
domain, comprising some 70 percent of
the earth's surface. Although some of
the advanced nations had shown interest
in establishing control over the seabed
since World War II, it remained for tiny
Malta to bring the seabed issue to the
forefront of international politics with
impassioned pleas to the United Nations

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

573
to preven t a mad scram hIe for the ocean
floor. Since that time there has been
some moderate progress toward asserting international control over the un·
claimed reaches of the ocean bottom,
bu t to many this has amounted to
nothing more than tokenism.
Thus, despite some accommodation,
the seabed issue remains a perplexing
political and technological problem. It is
a nexus of difficulties-security interests, participation of noncoastal states
in decisions, preservation of existing
claims to territorial seas, and freedom of
navigation are but a few of the seemingly insurmountable problems which
the international community faces in
trying to unravel this issue.
Given these difficulties, it is of great
interest that in the past few years a large
number of states, including the United
States and the Soviet Union, have been
able to reach an accord on banning
nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction from the seabed. The
negotiations provide an excellent case
study of the machinations of international politics.
The birth of the seabed issue and the
acceptance of the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction also can be seen
as a microcosm of superpower relations.
The seabed arms control treaty, perhaps
better than any other international
agreement in recent history, illustrates
the shifting power relationships which
have accompanied the waning of the
bipolar, cold war relationship of the
immediate postwar years. It is a prime
example of what we might call, for lack
of a better term, "superpower symbiosis," i.e., a relationship in which
advanced states with divergent goals
temporarily join forces to achieve a
specific end_ They eschew collision policies for collusion even, as in this case,
when the net result is a treaty which
neither state favors in its entirety.
The seabed arms control issue, then,
is important for a number of reasons. In
itself it is a prime example of the sort of

technology-dependent issue which is
likely to occur with increasing frequency in the relations of nations. But
more important, it is a useful vehicle for
the study of changing superpower relations and the burgeoning of a multipolar
international political system. This
paper examines the seabed arms control
treaty negotiations from 1967 to 1971
and the treaty's relationship to changing
United States-Soviet relations.
The military and economic potential
of the seabed was recognized as far back
as World War II. In September 1945
President Truman issued a proclamation
declaring that the United States regarded the natural resources of the
seabed and subsoil of the Continental
Shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United
States as appertaining to this country's
jurisdiction and control. Other states,
notably the United Kingdom, Australia,
and the oil-rich Trucial States of the
Persian Gulf followed suit. A number of
Latin American States, particularly
Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, claimed exclusive jurisdiction not only over the
seabed and its subsoil to a distance of
200 miles, bu t in some cases to the high
seas above. These rapidly escalating
claims alarmed many members of the
in ternational community, especially
when they infringed on traditional concepts of freedom of the seas. In an
attempt to head them off, the United
Nations General Assembly referred the
issue to the International Law Commission in 1951. The Commission refused
to sanction the unilateral claims of
states as a basis for an international law
of the seabed, but agreed to prepare a
draft set of rules which eventually
evolved into the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. This
provided the only constructive set of
rules on the seabed to which the international community had given its assent
when the seabed arms control issue was
raised in 1968.
The 1958 Convention is extremely
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limited in scope. It deals only with the
Continental Shelf and not the seabed as
a whole. The Continental Shelf is defined as:
... the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the
coast bu t ou tside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200
meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas?
The Continental Shelf Convention
confers on the coastal state exclusive
rights over the Continental Shelf for the
purposes of exploring it and exploiting
its natural resources and, by implication, for military purposes as well. It
provides, however, that this jurisdiction
shall not extend to the high seas and
airspace above the shelf, a provision
which has not induced some states to
abandon their previously claimed 200
mile limits nor deterred others from
advancing similar claims. The Continental Shelf Convention states that occupation or explicit proclamation is not
required to make the coastal state's
jurisdiction effective, thus leaving open
the possibility of emplanting secret
facilities while remaining within the
letter of the law.
The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention was successful in constraining the
rising tide of excessive claims to submarine lands. But it was a compromise
document hammered out over a period
of months to accommodate the interests
of some 66 states which rarely saw eye
to eye on the important issues. It was a
stopgap measure and, like all stopgap
measures, it has deficiencies. As we have
seen, it leaves the door open for clandes·
tine military operations on the ocean
floor. Its scope is extremely limited.
Further, it fails to set up any international machinery to oversee the operation of the convention.
But the most glaring deficiency of
the Continental Shelf Convention, when

applied to the problem of regulating the
use of the seabed, is its failure to define
the precise limits of national jurisdiction. It provides a definition of the
Continental Shelf that is technologydependent, thus increasing the temptation to the developed states that they
intrude into the unclaimed domain of
the seabed. In effect, the convention
provides that any action which a state is
technologically capable of carrying out
is legal and, further, that that action can
have the side effect of appropriating
submarine lands to national jurisdiction.
The situation under the 1958 convention is analogous to that faced by
the international community a few
years ago when a few advanced sta tes
were on the threshold of developing
space weapons. Today, marine science
and technology are opening an entirely
new and unclaimed world-a domain
that not long ago was every bit as
remote as the outer planets. Just as
international machinery was established
to define the status of heavenly bodies
and to prohibit certain military actions,
the need has been perceived to regulate
the actions of states in exploiting the
ocean floor for military and economic
purposes.
This need has been forcefully highlighted by the Maltese Ambassador to
the United Nations, Avrid Pardo. In
1967 he ou tlined to the General As·
sembly his view of the dangers inherent
in the lack of international controls over
the seabed. 3 In addition to citing military dangers, Ambassador Pardo expressed concern that the developed
countries would appropriate vast areas
of the seabed, thus shutting out the
poorer nations from a source of great
revenue and an opportunity to upgrade
their technical capabilities. Such developments, he said, would further increase
friction not only among the advanced
nations, but between the developed and
less developed countries as well.
Motivated by his concern over the
military potential of the seabed, but
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more immediately by the prospect of
raising revenue by developing the ocean
floor, Pardo proposed that the international community declare the seabed,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, to be the common heritage of all
mankind_ This concept has become a
cen tral theme in discussions of the
seabed issue and has increased the pressures on the superpowers to negotiate
away their technological advantages_
Spurred on by the Pardo speech, the
United Nations General Assembly
voted, on 18 December 1967, to establish an ad hoc committee "to
study ... the reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposes of the seabed ... 4 Both
the United States and the Soviet Union
were made members of this body. The
United States sponsored the resolution,
together with a number of other states.
The Soviets, however, declined to act as
cosponsors. In fact, the Soviet delegate
to the General Assembly indicated that
his government felt that it was risky to
create a new body. The issue was, in his
view, too complex to attack without
further study. Further, he felt, "Disarmament, and, primarily, nuclear disarmament, would preclude the oceanbed from being militarily exploited."s
The work of the ad hoc committee
was taken over a year later by a permanent, 42-member committee. 6 This organization has been the focus for much
of the discussion on limiting military
uses of the seabed, but, as the Soviet
U.N. delegate predicted, it has complicated the issue more than it has clarified
it. All of the productive work on the
seabed arms control question has been
accomplished under the auspices of the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), formerly the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Conference
(ENDC). Both superpowers have preferred to concentrate their seabed arms
control efforts in this body, possibly for
the sake of a better coordinated overall
arms control policy.
This, then, is the formal organiza-

tional framework in which the seabed
arms issue was worked out. There are
also, of course, a host of informal
relationships and communications channels which are more difficult to discern.
Obviously, the superpowers engaged in
some private consultations with each
other and, probably to a lesser extent,
with their allies. Nevertheless, the agreement reached bears the unmistakable
stamp of the United Nations, and its
negotiation in this forum is one of the
primary factors which helped to fashion
the final shape of the treaty.
Despite the progress made by modern science in exploiting the ocean
depths, the seabed remains a hostile
environment. The greatest achievements
of technology must be brought to bear
in order to achieve any measurable
degree of success in harnessing its potential as a location for military operations.
Most obvious, of course, is the requirement for life support systems for men
working on the ocean floor, a prerequisite for many operations. Further,
structures emplanted on the seabed
must be able to withstand tremendous
pressures and must be secured against
shifting currents. Ordinary sensing devices, such as radar, are virtually useless
under water. Only sound has proved to
be a reliable undersea sensor, and even it
is extremely limited in range. Wholly
new methods of communications and
control must be worked out for military
structures on the ocean floor. Thus it is
evident that the use of this environment
for military purposes is difficult and, as
a consequence, expensive.
Nevertheless, it appears that the
momentum of technology has driven
military strategists of both the East and
West to consider placing military-related
structures on the seabed. For example,
the U.S. Defense Science Board has
considered mounting large missiles in
silos on the ocean floor. Such installations, like ballistic missile submarines,
would be relatively invulnerable to attack but could carry much larger
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missiles than subs can. The United
States has also proposed huge selfpropelled vehicles which would crawl
along the ocean floor, carrying missiles. 7 These "crawlers" would be controlled by umbilical cords, a concept
which has been proven out by the deep
submergence vehicle CURV III. Also
discussed have been nuclear mines situated in strategic ocean areas. 8
In addition to such offensive weapons, there are a variety of defensive
systems which could be installed on the
ocean bottom. According to The New
York Times, the United States has an
extensive series of ocean-floor-mounted
sensirig devices designed to pick up
sounds emitted by passing submarines in
the Atlantic and Pacific. The U.S. Navy
is also said to have similar devices in key
narrows; for example, the Straits of
Malacca and Gibraltar. Although the
Soviet Union does not discuss such
devices directly, we can infer from
certain of their public statements that
they too have seabed installations, at
least close to their own shores. One
Soviet commentator, for example, has
stated that "modern naval defense includes coastal fortifications and various
defensive installations sited on the seabed off shore.,,9 Some observers have
suggested that the Soviets are far behind
the United States in the development of
underwater detection devices, 10 but the
public literature on the seabed problem
is insufficient to draw any firm conclusions as to who is ahead. It is significant,
however, that both superpowers are
apparently actively pursuing the emplacement of defensive installations on
the seabed.
The difficulties of operation in the
deep ocean environment suggest that
the installation of military devices on
the seabed would be an extremely expensive undertaking. One scientist has
stated that the cost of a complete
underwater defense system would
"make the space program budget look
miniscule by comparison." I I It is

hardly surprising, then, that the United
States and the Soviet Union, which have
both been concerned about the impact
of expensive military programs on their
economies, would show interest in
limiting what could become history's
most expensive arms race. Typically,
however, the two states have approached the issue of controlling military programs on the ocean floor from
different points of view. Nevertheless, it
is evident that the seabed issue has the
potential to serve as the catalyst for
what may be termed a "superpower
symbiosis," in view of the vested interest of both powers in maintaining an
acceptable rate of economic growth in
the face of escalating arms costs. Thus,
despite the military potential of the
seabed, there are powerful pressures
which tend to drive the superpowers
toward accommodation.
After some initial reluctance to endorse the formation of the Seabed
Comrillttee, the Soviet leadership apparently arrived at the conclusion that
the control of arms on the ocean floor
was an issue worth exploring. It was the
Soviet U.N. Representative Yakov A.
Malik who first broached the question
of demilitarizing the seabed in an international forum. In June 1968 he called
for outlawing the use of the ocean floor
for military purposes as a prerequisite to
any agreement on the exploitation of
subsurface resources. 12 That same
month the Soviet delegate to the ad hoc
Seabed Committee proposed a draft
resolution which called on all governments to utilize the seabed and ocean
floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes. He also suggested that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference
be requested to consider the question of
prohibiting the use of the sea and ocean
floors beyond territorial waters for military purposes. During these early
months of seabed discussions, most of
the other committee members focused
their attention on the matter of regu-
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lating economic exploitation. I 3
Only a few days later the Soviet
Government issued a statement which
helps to place the seabed issue in per·
spective. On the occasion of the signing
of the Non·Proliferation Treaty, Premier
Kosygin submitted to the United Na·
tions a nine·point proposal entitled
"Urgent Measures for Ending the Arms
Race." I 4 The Soviets memorandum
called for negotiations on the following
points:
1. Banning the use of nuclear weap·
ons.
2. Ending the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the destruction of
existing stockpiles.
3. Limiting and then reducing the
means of delivering nuclear weapons.
4. A ban on flights of nuclear weapon-carrying bombers outside national
airspace.
5. A ban on underground nuclear
tests.
6. au tlawing biological and chemical
weapons.
7. Liquidation of foreign military
bases.
8. Regional disarmament.
9. Banning the. establishment of
fixed military installations on the seabed and also any other military activity.
Of course, the Soviets no doubt
realized that many of these topics were
simply not negotiable in the present
political context. It is unlikely that they
seriously considered that such a comprehensive package could ever be adopted,
bu t they no doubt saw considerable
propaganda value in making the proposal. In addition, they probably hoped
that some of the points could be discussed, since each of them could benefit
the U.S.S.R., either by constraining
Western military capabilities, and thus
improving the Soviet Union's net security posture, or by narrowing the
realm of strategic competition, thereby
freeing resources for the development of
nonmilitary sectors of their economy.

The seabed arms control proposal fits
both of these criteria. The Soviet Union,
with the world's largest submarine
force, is no doubt greatly concerned
about the effectiveness of U.S. undersea
surveillance. If they could succeed in
demilitarizing the seabed, the Soviets
could force the United States to dismantle its antisubmarine listening devices, thus reducing Western defenses
against submarines. If, as noted earlier,
the Soviets are indeed behind the West
in this aspect of military technology,
they would have less to lose from a
defensive standpoint and more to gain
by enhancing the safety of their submarines in the open ocean. Failing this, the
Soviets could also benefit from any
measure which could reduce the pressure probably being exerted by some
groups within the U.S.S.R. to expand
the arms race to the ocean floor. Although there is no direct evidence to
support the assessment, it seems reasonable to suppose that there are those in
the Soviet Navy and the defense-relateq.
ministries who would favor such a
move. While the pressure for adopting
such a course might not have been great
in 1968, it is more likely to grow than
to decline with the passing of time. In
view of the enormous expenditures
which would probably be required for
an effective seabed strategic weapon
system, it is not surprising that some
elements of the Soviet leadership would
be interested in foreclosing the seabed
option not only for the West, but for
their own military establishment.
Not surprisingly, Washington viewed
the Soviet nine-point proposal as unacceptable. In July of 1968, however,
President Johnson responded by urging
the Disarmament Conference to adopt a
"workable, verifiable and effective
agreement to bar the use of the seabed
for the emplacement of weapons of
mass destruction." ls Thus he declined
to consider demilitarizing the ocean
floor in favor of a limit on the deployment of nuclear weapons and other
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(unidentified) weapons of mass destruction.
The remainder of the year saw little
progress on the seabed arms control
issue. The Soviet delegates to the Seabed Committee and the Disarmament
Conference continued to stress demilitarization, while other nations called for
the use of the seabed for "peaceful
purposes," not excluding defensive military operations. 16 In December the
General Assembly created a permanent
Seabed Committee, but this development received scant attention in the
Soviet press. 17
The Soviets seized the opportunity
afforded by the change of U.S. administrations in January 1969 to reiterate
their nine·point proposal to the United
States. 18 They followed it up with the
su bmission, on 18 March of a draft
treaty on the demilitarization of the
seabed to the Disarmament Conference
at Geneva. The Soviet treaty would have
banned nuclear weapons and military
installations of any kind on the ocean
floor beyond a 12-mile limit. It provided for inspection of underwater
structures on the basis of "reciprocity,"
apparently meaning that only nations
which had seabed structures could inspect those of other nations. A number
of nations were not satisfied with this
method and asked for clarification. In
addition, the conference split on the
scope of the ban. A majority of the
members supported the U.S.S.R.'s call
for total demilitarization, while the
United States and its allies "maintained
that a total ban on military activity on
the seabed, particularly the emplacement of equipment for tracking potentially hostile submarines would not permit coastal states to take necessary and
vital measures for defence and would
also be unverifiable in the difficult
marine environment.,,19 U.S. officials
also feared that a ban on all military
activity could be interpreted to include
communications and navigation equipment used by both civilian and naval

vessels and the participation of military
personnel in scientific research projects
on the ocean floor. Other states expressed doubts about the proposed
12·mile limit.2o As a consequence of
these disagreements, the United States
submitted its own draft on 22 May
prohibiting nuclear weapons, weapons
of mass destruction, and associated
fixed launching platforms on the seabed
beyond a 3-mile limit, with verification
by observation and consultation. 2 1
It is interesting to note that, in the
days immediately preceding the Soviet
proposal, there was no hint in the press
that such a move was forthcoming. In
fact, on the day before the draft was
presented at Geneva, the Soviet representative to the Conference was quoted
as saying, "The question of banning the
use of nuclear weapons ic; being placed
in the foreground." He also mentioned
barring the manufacture and stockpiling
of nuclear weapons, bans on foreign
bases, chemical and biological weapons,
and nuclear bomber flights as well as
regional disarmament. 22 The seabed
issue was conspicuous by its absence.
We might speculate that the details of
the proposal were still being worked out
at the highest levels and that Soviet
representative Roschin was not free to
discuss it even though he probably knew
that the move was forthcoming. This
view tends to be confirmed by the fact
that it was Kosygin himself who made
the first announcement of the draft
treaty to the press. 2 3 It is possible then,
that some interests in the Soviet Union
were opposed to any proposal, which
foreclosed the possibility of future
Soviet military exploitation of the
ocean floor.
At about this time there began to be
hints that some states were wary of
what could turn out to be superpower
collusion to block arms control progress. The British, Canadian, and Nigerian
representatives at Geneva urged that the
seabed issue be shelved temporarily in
favor of a ban on underground nuclear
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testing. The implication was that the
United States and the U.S.S.R. were
deliberately placing an issue of little
consequence-the seabed-ahead of
more vital issues. These fears were to
become more pronounced as the negotiations proceeded. 24
Over the next few months the principals exchanged views on the treaty, with
the United States maintaining that a
complete demilitarization would be
both impractical and unenforceable.
The Soviet Union clarified its proposal
somewhat by conceding that devices
such as navigation beacons could be
exempt, but insisted on including antisu bmarine devices. 2s Further, the
Soviets maintained, a complete ban on
military installations would actually be
easier to police than one which prohibited only certain kinds of activities.
States began to identify themselves with
the proposals, with Sweden backing the
U.S.S.R. and Japan and some of the
NATO countries siding with the United
States. Canada proposed a compromise
which would bar "undersea weapons,
military activities, bases or fortifications
from which military action could be
undertaken.,,26 However, neither major
protagonist showed a willingness to
accept the Canadian proposal.
Finally, in August, the superpowers
began to move closer together. Informed sources in Geneva suggested that
a compromise could be reached. The
United States and the U.S.S.R., who as
cochairmen of the Disarmament Conference had extended its deliberations
for several weeks beyond the scheduled
adjournment, agreed on a draft early in
October. In exchange for a widening of
the exempted zone to 12 miles, Moscow
agreed that the treaty should encompass
only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 2 7 The Soviet
press played down the compromise
aspect. In a statement on 7 October,
Roschin said that the treaty would solve
"the most important part of the problem ... ,,28 but he also stressed that

this was, in the Soviet view, only a step
toward the eventual demilitarization of
the ocean floor.
The agreement appears to have been
a rather straightforward case of compromise. The Soviets gained U.S. assent to a
12-mile limit, which they probably saw
as a valuable bit of leverage for the
U.N.-sponsored Law of the Sea Conference to be held in 1973. In addition, by
banning nuclear weapons, they would
still have some hope of avoiding the
most costly of the potential seabed
military systems. The United States, on
the other hand, succeeded in excluding
its antisubmarine devices from the ban.
This must have caused some concern
among those in the Soviet Union who
are responsible for submarine operations, but it does suggest that immediate
military utility can give way to pragmatic economic considerations in the
Soviet approach to international negotiations.
October 1969 marked a crucial turning point in the negotiations. With the
United States and the U.S.S.R. both
backing the treaty, passage seemed to be
virtually assured, but even more important than the issue itself was the pattern
of interplay among the principal international actors which evolved from the
compromise. From that point forward,
the .two superpowers adopted a symbiotic relationship, abandoning or submerging their differences in order to
present a united front to opponents of
the proposed treaty. The opponents
were many and, interestingly, included
allies of both the United States and the
U.S.S.R., as well as nonaligned nations.
Over the next months, charges of superpower collusion and obstructionism
were heard more and more frequently.
In many ways the two giants stood
almost alone against their many detractors.
Criticisms of the treaty proposal centered around three issues: verification,
rights of coastal states, and the veto
power accorded to nuclear weapon
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states. Article III of the draft stated that
"states parties to the treaty shall have
the righ t to verify ... using their own
means or with the assistance of any
other state party.,,29 A number of
states, including Canada, Italy, and
Sweden, considered these provisions to
be inadequate. Canada submitted proposed changes in the form of a working
paper which recommended that the
Secretary General of the United Nations
be given the power and the means to
assist in supervising compliance if requested by states which lacked the
technical resources to carry out such
opera tions themselves. 3 0 Both the
United States and the U.S.S.R. were
reluctant to endorse this proposal, but
probably for different reasons. The
United States no doubt realized that the
major burden of financing an extensive
U.N. verification capability would fall
squarely on the shoulders of the United
States and that it would be extremely
difficult, to say the least, to get such
expenditures appropriated. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, was probably
motivated primarily by its traditional
reluctance to upgrade the powers of the
Secretary General.
Coastal states objected to the draft
for several reasons. First, the status of
the region between the 12-mile limit
and the outer boundary of territorial
waters was obscure. It appeared to some
as if one state could legally emplant
weapons between 3 and 12 miles from
the coast of another state. A number of
nations also objected to referring to the
1958 Geneva Convention, which nearly
one-third of the U.N. members had not
ratified. Finally, Canada demanded that
verification operations within the 12mile limit of a coastal state be approved
by that state in advance, thus presenting
an apparent limitation on traditional
freedom of the seas.
The other major objection was an
ou tgrowth of article IV of the draft,
which specified that amendment required a majority vote, including an

affirmative vote by all nuclear powers.31 Fears that this would lead to a
nuclear power monopoly were widespread and were apparently voiced outside of the U.N. forum. A Soviet broadcast to China on 24 October took pains
to deny that the seabed treaty was an
"attempt to deceive the peace-loving
people and to legalize the arms race." It
further declared that "No anti-Soviet
slander is of any help in the matter.,,32
Apparently the Soviets were quite sensitive to criticism on this issue from the
other major Communist power.
As a result of these pressures, the
United States and the Soviet Union
presented a revised treaty on 24 October. The revision clarified the status
of the area between the 3-mile limit and
the 12-mile contiguous zone and deleted
the nuclear power veto provision. It
restored a requirement for a review
conference every 5 years which had
been dropped in the first joint draft at
the insistence of the U.S.S.R. It also
provided that disputes could be taken to
the Security Council and inserted a new
article in the preamble assuring that the
previous rights of coastal states would
not be altered by the treaty.33
These concessions, with the possible
exception of giving up their veto power,
were not critical to the superpower
duopoly. It is interesting, however, that
they were able to agree on a revised
draft within 3 weeks after having submitted the initial proposal. Evidently
the pressure from allies and competitors
alike forced them to act in concert once
again in order to safeguard their common interest in having the document
approved.
These revisions, however, did not
satisfy the critics. Brazil reserved its
position on the treaty. Canada and
others, including Yugoslavia, vowed to
continue to voice their objections in the
General Assembly. The Seabed Committee complained that it had not been
given enough time for a proper review
of the treaty.34 While the two co-
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sponsors pleaded for endorsement,
smaller nations, including members of
the Atlantic Alliance, charged that the
superpowers were making their own
deals at the expense of the rest of the
world.
As a result the U.N. General Assembly First (Political) Committee
voted to send the treaty back to Geneva
for revision and resubmission at the
next General Assembly session.3s The
Soviets played down the rebuff. Five
days after the treaty was rejected by the
U.N., Radio Moscow called the seabed
negotiations the highlight of the session.
It mentioned suggestions by Sweden,
Canada, and Brazil but failed to report
the First Committee's action. 3 6
No further action was taken until the
Disarmament Conference reconvened in
April 1970. But in March, Rumania
called for deferring the seabed issue in
favor of general disarmament. Now formal allies of both superpowers had
joined the opposition. 3 7
On 21 April the sponsors offered
more concessions. The latest revision to
the treaty required that if any party
should decide to conduct verification
operations within the Continental Shelf
of a coastal state, it must notify that
state and invite its participation. It also
expressly stated that the treaty would
not prejudice the claims of any nation
under "international law," a concession
to those who objected to using the 1958
Geneva Convention as a basis for the
treaty.38 This latest version of the joint
United States-U.S.S.R. draft treaty,
however, still failed to provide a means
of verification for those states who
lacked the capability themselves. Objections were raised about this point, but
the superpower coalition was clearly
willing to concede points in order to
enhance the treaty's chances of gaining
endorsement.
Then, on 24 August, the Soviet
Union made a surprise move by submitting a proposal for complete demilitarization of the ocean floor to the

Seabed Committee. 3 9 This turn of
events can be explained partly in terms
of the Soviets' continuing interest in
eventually forcing the West to give up
its lead in antisubmarine devices, but
more importantly their actions were
related to the timing of the announcement. The United States was making
preparations to dump a quantity of
obsolete nerve gas in the Atlantic, and
the Soviets probably saw a clear chance
for making substantial propaganda gains
by playing up the U.S.S.R. 's peaceloving position on the seabed. This
estimate is borne out by the considerable press coverage given to the Seabed
Committee's condemnation of the U.S.
action. 40
In September the superpower partners made more concessions. They
added a provision which required the
parties to continue negotiations in good
faith aimed at ending the seabed arms
race, with the obvious aim of placating
Sweden. Incidentally, of course, this
bolstered the Soviet Union's initial position. The latest draft made it mandatory
that any state initiating verification procedures notify all other parties of the
beginning of such operations and the
results of the inspection. Finally, it
added the provision that verification
could be accomplished "through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the UN and in
accordance with its charter, as well as
through bi-Iateral arrangements.,,41
Thus the proposal placated Canada,
while not committing the United States
to fund a separate U.N. verification
effort. The language was also vague
enough so that the Soviet Union could,
if it desired, read it to include only the
Security Council and not the Secretary
General. As a result of these concessions, the Disarmament Committee
approved the draft on 4 September by a
vote of 24 to 1. Only Mexico demurred,
contending that the superpowers had
retained the option of installing weapons on their allies' territory.42
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With the Disarmament Committee's
approval, the treaty breezed through the
U.N. On 17 November the First Committee endorsed it by a vote of 91 to 2,
with 6 abstentions. Peru and EI Salvador, who claim 200-mile territorial seas,
voted against the resolution, while
Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Kuwait,
Senegal, and Thailand abstained. Tanzania expressed concern that the treaty
did not include nuclear submarines. 43
The treaty then passed to the General Assembly. While it was being considered, the Soviet Union showed great
sensitivity to charges of collusion with
the United States. A Pravda article on
the treaty stressed that it was considered to be only the first step toward
demilitarizing the seabed and that certain (unspecified) Western Powers "have
overtly attempted to hamper constructive discussions of the disarmament
issue.,,44 This was apparently directed
at those who felt the Russians and the
Americans were getting too cozy, while
remaining oblique enough so as not to
upset the burgeoning "era of negotiations."
In December the General Assembly
adopted, by a vote of 104 to 2, with 2
abstentions, a resolution commending
the Treaty Banning the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof
for signature and ratification. Again,
Peru and El Salvador opposed the
treaty, while France and Ecuador abstained. 45
On 11 February 1971, the treaty was
signed in Washington, London, and Moscow, climaxing over 2 years of negotiation. 46 The Soviet ceremony was
attended by, inter alia, Marshall of the
Soviet Union Yakubovskiy and navy
commander in chief, Admiral of the
Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov. 47 This high ranking military delegation suggests that the military in
general, and the navy in particular, had
a great deal of interest in the negoti-

ations and may have had a hand in the
formulation of the Soviet position.
Kosygin's statement on signing the
treaty emphasized the difficulty of the
negotiations and repeated the assertion
that the Soviet Government regarded it
as only the initial step toward complete
demilitarization of the ocean floor. 4II
One Soviet commentator expanded
slightly on the theme that denuclearization was the most important aspect of
seabed arms control when he stressed
that utilization of the seabed for military purposes is limited not by economic considerations, but by technological possibilities and "militarystrategic purposefulness.,,49 This statement provides more indirect evidence
that in the U.S.S.R., as well as in the
West, there are pressures from the "military-industrial complex" to develop and
deploy seabed military systems. Similarly, in both countries, the governments appear to be anxious to head off
another round of expenditures on such
systems before it gets out of hand.
To the end, the Soviets tried to fend
off accusations that they were collaborating with the United States for selfserving purposes. On the eve of the
signature ceremony, TASS broadcast an
apologia for the Soviet position.
It is well known that after the
development of science and technology made it possible to start
practical use of the seabed and the
ocean floor, the aggressive imperialist circles started making
plans for using in military purposes these spaces that take up
over two-thirds of the earth's surface ... It is the Soviet Union
that proposed to use the seabed
and ocean floor only in peaceful
purposes.... It is no secret that
imperialism placed many blocs
[sic] on the road to ... disarmament. 50
One wonders if the commentator doth
not protest too much!
Now that the treaty has been signed,
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its significance lies not merely in the
fact that nuclear weapons have been
banned from the seabed. More impor·
tantly it is a symbol, a symptom of
changing power structures in an evolving
international system. Together with
similar ventures, such as SALT, it marks
the dissolution of the "zero sum"
approach to East-West negotiations.
Analysis of the treaty in its final
form, however, reveals several shortcomings. Obviously, it does nothing to
change the present balance of strategic
forces. -Conceivably, complete demilitarization could have altered the EastWest strategic balance by neutralizing
whatever strategic antisubmarine detection systems the United States might
have deployed. This might well have
been stabilizing in the long run, since it
would have brought the survivability of
the Soviet ballistic missile submarine
force to a level equal to that of our
POLARIS force, thus giving both sides
an assured destruction capability. This,
in tum, would have increased the deterrent value of both forces, all the more
so since, with present technology, ballistic missile submarines are probably better suited for use as countervalue rather
than counterforce systems. The combination of assured destruction with the
lack of a first strike system on both
sides would seem to suggest a high
degree of mutual deterrence.
In addition to its failure to demilita·
rize the seabed the treaty also fails to
prohibit some kinds of nuclear weapon
installations as well. Article I prohibits a
state only from "emplanting or emplacing" a nuclear weapon, launcher, or
storage facility. It does not prohibit
mobile installations such as a nuclear
su bmarine resting on the bottom. Further, it apparently permits the deployment of "crawlers," mobile missile platforms which move along the ocean
floor. To prohibit such vehicles, it has
been argued, would be to limit freedom
of navigation. 5 1
Perhaps the treaty's greatest de-

ficiency, however, is that it leaves the
thousands of square miles of ocean floor
between the coast and the 12-mile limit
free of any restriction whatsoever.
There is some merit to the initial U.S.
argument that this area is the most
likely region for the deployment of
seabed weapons, given its relative accessibility. 5 2 Thus the treaty has not prohibited the emplacement of weapons of
mass destruction on the ocean bottomj
it has merely narrowed the area available for deployment by coastal states,
including those states most likely to
develop such weapons.
It would be a mistake, however, to
deduce from these shortcomings that
the treaty is worthless. It has done what
any arms control measure must donarrow the scope of strategic competition. In this regard it would have been
valuable even if it had exempted a 25 or
a 50-mile contiguous zone. What the
treaty has accomplished, providing it is
carried out in good faith, is to decrease
the temptation to develop exorbitantly
expensive weapon systems, those intended to carry nuclear weapons to the
deep ocean floor. Its major value may
well have been to the signatory governments in their internal budget squab·
blings, for it has effectively undercut
those who would argue that permanent
nuclear weapon installations on the
deep seabed are "essential to national
survival." The treaty's real importance,
then, as a substantive arms control
measure, may not be fully realized until
such time as these costly installations
become technically and economically
feasible. At that time it might be useful
for the administration or Politburo to
have legal excuse for saying no to its
military-industrial lobbyists.
Beyond its substantive value, the
seabed treaty is important as a symbol
of the phenomenon we have called
"superpower symbiosis." During the
course of the negotiations, we have seen
the two major protagonists move from
contention to collusion. This action has

a
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its parallel, of course, in SALT, but also
in economic relations and in those
difficult international situations which
involve restrained competition-"the
Middle East and Vietnam, where both
powers have a common interest in
avoiding a direct conflict.
Whether or not this symbiotic rela·
tionship can continue depends, of
course, on a myriad of factors, both
internal and external to each superpower's political structure,:;, but the'
successful negotiation of the seabed
treaty is in itself a hopeful sign. During
the intense rivalry of the fifties, when
East-West relations were seen in terms
of a zero-sum game, few would have
predicted that the United States and the
U.S.S.R. would someday find them-

selves defending a draft treaty against
attacks from members of both NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. The fact that they
have now done so and that they have
accommodated to pressures from their
critics suggests that all concerned have
realized the vastly altered rules of international conduct which have been imposed by nuclear parity between the
superpowers as well as by the emergence
of a multipolar political world. Today's
world, with its vast network of communications and interdependencies, has
forced all states into a kind of symbiosis, and as long as the spirit of
common interest and mutual collaboration evident in the seabed negotiations
can be maintained, that relationship is
more likely to evolve into a force for
stability and progress.
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